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POST-PETITION EARNINGS AND INDIVIDUAL CHAPTER 11
DEBTORS: AVOIDING A HEAD START
Stacy L. Daly*
A fresh start is all that they can ask for. The Bankruptcy Code'
("Code") gives debtors the opportunity to clean their slates of past
mistakes and begin a new financial life. Individual debtors may avail
themselves of three primary types of proceedings under the Code.
Chapter 7 forces the debtor to liquidate most of his assets and uses the
proceeds from the liquidation to satisfy creditors. Any remaining debt
is generally discharged. Under Chapter 13, the debtor has the
exclusive right to propose and file a repayment plan.
If the
bankruptcy court confirms the debtor's plan and the debtor performs
under its terms, the debtor is discharged of all debts not provided for
by the plan. Chapter 11, similar to Chapter 13, allows the debtor to
propose and file a plan of reorganization under which debts are paid.
In Chapter 11, however, this right is not exclusive to the debtor
because creditors can also file a plan of reorganization after a period
of exclusivity has expired. Debtors can propose a plan that makes
distributions from property of the estate, although the provisions of
Chapter 11 do not require the use of estate property to fund the plan.2
The Chapter 11 debtor receives his discharge when the bankruptcy
court confirms the plan, though he still must abide by the plan's terms.
Although individual debtors are eligible to file for bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code regardless of
whether they are engaged in business,' courts are not equipped to deal
with individual debtors under this chapter because its provisions are
aimed at business debtors.4 For example, Chapter 11 does not require
* Many thanks to Mom, Dad, and my brother, Tom, for all of their support.

Special thanks to Professor Susan Block-Lieb for her invaluable expertise, input, and
cheerleading that enabled me to write this monster. I would also like to thank the
Hon. Adali S. Hardin, Jr., United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District
of New York, for planting the seed that became a Note.
1. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994). Unless otherwise indicated, any statutory
reference in this Note is to the Bankruptcy Code.
2. See id. §§ 1101-1174.
3. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991).
4. See In re Weber, 209 B.R. 793, 797 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (-Since the
Supreme Court held in Toibb v. Radloff... that an individual debtor not engaged in
business is eligible for Chapter 11 relief, bankruptcy courts have struggled to
determine the standards for proper administration of such a case." (citations
omitted)).
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that the individual debtor contribute his post-petition earnings to fund
his plan of reorganization, although some courts have so required.
Additional complications arise when the debtor is a sole proprietor.
When adjudicating individual Chapter 11 cases, courts have
generally focused their efforts on what constitutes distributable
property of the estate under section 541. 5 This focus, however, is
misplaced. Instead, courts should concentrate their efforts on
determining whether the debtor is able to confirm a plan of
reorganization under section 11296 because there is no provision in
Chapter 11 that requires that the debtor use estate property to fund
his plan, and thus the precise contours of the estate do not matter in
an individual Chapter 11 case. Courts' efforts to determine what
should be classified as property of the estate are not completely in
vain, however, because identification and valuation of property of the
estate is necessary to determine whether the plan of reorganization
satisfies the "best interest of creditors test."7 Courts will also have to
make determinations about property of the estate if the case is
converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation.8 But the primary issue in an
individual Chapter 11 case should be how the individual debtor will
fund a plan, not what property constitutes the estate.
In determining what constitutes property of the estate, most courts
have fiercely protected the individual debtor by refusing to include in
the estate the post-petition earnings of the individual debtor.' Other
courts, faced with the issue of plan confirmation, have disregarded
section 541 and the debtor's fresh start by holding that the individual
debtor must use post-petition earnings to fund a plan in order to
satisfy section 1129(a)(3), which requires that the plan be proposed in
good faith, and section 1129(a)(11), which requires that the plan be
feasible." Although the focus for the individual Chapter 11 debtor
should be plan confirmation, confirmation should not be at the
expense of the debtor's fresh start." To satisfy both purposes of the
5. See, e.g., FitzSimmons v. Walsh (In re FitzSimmons), 725 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th
Cir. 1984) (holding individual debtor's post-petition earnings not included as property
of the estate under section 541(a)(6), but that the earnings of the sole proprietorship
were included); see also infra Parts I.B, II (discussing property of the estate and the
courts' struggle with this determination).
6. See 7 Collier on Bankruptcy 9 1129.01 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1999);
see also infra Part IV (discussing confirmation in individual Chapter 11 cases).
7. See infra notes 62-65, 113 (describing the "best interest of creditors" test).
8. See infra notes 73-81 (detailing section 1112(b) regarding conversion or
dismissal).
9. See infra Part II for an examination of cases that have held that the postpetition earnings of the individual debtor are excluded from the bankruptcy estate
and the policy rationale behind this exclusion.
10. See infra Part III (discussing the individual debtor and Chapter 11 plan
confirmation).
11. See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text (discussing the debtor's fresh

start).
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Code-the debtor's fresh start and payment of the debtor's debts' 2-

Congress should amend the Code to provide courts with stricter
3

guidelines as to how to treat the individual debtor in Chapter 11.

Currently, the individual debtor in Chapter 11 is not statutorily
obligated to contribute post-petition14 earnings to fund a plan of
reorganization,'15 in contrast to the requirements of Chapter 13.16 The
individual debtor in Chapter 11 thus may propose a plan under which
he retains non-exempt assets, funds the plan with property of the
estate, and retains his post-petition earnings, paying creditors pennies
on the dollar." A plan such as this may satisfy the "best interest of
creditors test,'' 8 but does not approximate the amount the debtor
would be required to contribute under a disposable income test.'9
Although some courts have denied confirmation to plans under which
the debtor has the ability to pay debts from post-petition earnings, but
does not propose to use these earnings
to pay creditors, z0 there is scant
21
position.
their
for
statutory support
In order to address the uncertain treatment of the individual debtor
in Chapter 11, the Senate has recently passed a series of amendments
to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999.' These amendments would
require the individual debtor in Chapter 11 to contribute his post12. See Andrews v. Riggs Nat'l Bank (In re Andrews), 80 F.3d 906, 909-10 (4th
Cir. 1996); H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 32-33 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3340,3341; S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 7 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,5793.
13. The Senate has recently proposed such amendments to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1999. See infra Part IV for the text of these amendments and a
discussion of their possible effect on individual Chapter 11 debtors.
14. For the purposes of this Note, there is no difference between the terms -postpetition" and "post-commencement" when discussing the earnings of an individual
debtor.
15. Courts, however, have on occasion denied individual debtors confirmation in
Chapter 11 because of the debtor's refusal to include post-petition earnings as a
source of income to fund the plan. See, e.g., Roland v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 223 B.R.
499, 506 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998); see also infra Part III (discussing these courts'
decisions in greater detail).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1) (1994) (providing that the debtor's plan under
Chapter 13 includes the debtor's future earnings).
17. A creditor's active role in plan confirmation in Chapter 11 cases makes this
scenario unlikely. See id. § 1102 (providing for the appointment of creditors'
committees in Chapter 11); id. § 1103 (describing the powers and duties of the
creditors' committees) See generally David B. Tatge & Dwight D. Meier, Creditors'
Strategies In IndividualBankruptcy Cases Under Chapter11, 95 Com. I.-. 255, 258-89
(1990) (describing how creditors should respond to the individual Chapter 11 debtor).
18. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing the best interest of
creditors test).
19. See infra notes 104-06 (discussing the disposable income test).
20. See infra notes 207-43 and accompanying text (examining cases dealing with
the individual debtor and Chapter 11 confirmation standards).
21. See infra Part IV (discussing the lack of statutory support behind these courts'
interpretations). In addition, the results these courts reach contradict the results of
courts interpreting section 541(a)(6). See infra Part IV.
22. See 145 Cong. Rec. S14439 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1999).
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petition earnings to fund his plan of reorganization. If enacted, these
amendments would add a disposable income test to the confirmation
requirements of Chapter 11 for an individual debtor? This Note
argues that these amendments should ultimately be enacted into law,
and analyzes the reasons why.
Part I explores Chapters 7, 11, and 13 as they relate to the
individual debtor, and explains how property of the estate under
section 541 is defined differently under each chapter. Part II describes
the debtor's "fresh start" and analyzes cases interpreting section
541(a)(6) as applied to the individual Chapter 11 debtor, regardless of
whether that individual is a sole proprietor. Part III examines section
1129's standards for confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization proposed by an individual debtor, and finds that this
debtor may already be subject to a disposable income test similar to
that in Chapter 13. Part IV analyzes courts' interpretations of section
1129 in light of the policies behind the Code and urges that Congress
pass pending amendments that will statutorily require individual
debtors in Chapter 11 to devote their post-petition disposable income
toward funding their plans of reorganization.
I.

OVERVIEW OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

The law governing the relationship between debtors and creditors
existed hundreds of years before Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Code.24 Bankruptcy laws evolved as a mechanism to aid creditors in
the collection of debts.?5 Historically, debtors, formerly known as
bankrupts, were treated as criminals and could be sold to satisfy their
obligations.26 In the United States, Congress has enacted several
bankruptcy statutes over the past 150 years pursuant to its
constitutional power.27 Earlier statutes provided minimal relief to
debtors and creditors because only certain individuals or entities could
23. The disposable income test is currently found in Chapters 12 and 13, but not in
Chapter 11. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994) (no disposable income test) with
id. § 1222(a) (plan shall include future earnings of debtor) and id. § 1325(b)
(disposable income test). This test requires that the debtor fund his plan with his
post-petition income above that which is needed for reasonable and necessary living
expenses. See id. § 1325(b).
24. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330; Vern Countryman, A History of American
Bankruptcy Law, 81 Com. L.J. 226, 226-28 (1976) (describing the roots of American
bankruptcy law as derived from English bankruptcy law and Roman Law). The
current Bankruptcy Code is contained in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330.
25. See Carl Felsenfeld, Denial of Dischargefor SubstantialAbuse: Refining-Not
Changing-BankruptcyLaw, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1369, 1374-79 (1999) (detailing the

history of bankruptcy laws in ancient civilizations and the modern emergence of prodebtor law in the United States).
26. See id. at 1374-75.
27. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress to legislate "on the
subject of bankruptcies"); see also Countryman, supra note 24, at 228-32 (discussing
the history of the United States bankruptcy acts).
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take advantage of their provisions.' For example, the Bankruptcy
Act of 1800 was available only to creditors who wished to
involuntarily place their merchant debtors in bankruptcy.'
In
enacting subsequent Acts, Congress expanded the applicability of the
bankruptcy laws to include different types of debtors? Although
creditors historically have been in a position of power, able to extract
money from their debtors at almost any cost,3 over time, debtors have
received greater bankruptcy protection with each successive
enactment of bankruptcy legislation, culminating in the "debtorfriendly" Bankruptcy Act of 1978.32
Two overarching purposes of the Bankruptcy Code are the
protection of creditors' interests and the protection of the debtor's
"fresh start." 33 Although the Code itself does not make mention of
the debtor's "fresh start," it does provide for "discharge," an
exoneration for the debtor of all debts unpaid after the bankruptcy.3
The policy of protecting the debtor's fresh start is evident in many
sections of the Code 35 and reflects a desire to allow the "honest but
unfortunate debtor" a chance to start anew.' Although the debtor's
fresh start remains among the most important bankruptcy policy
considerations, Congress has amended the Code several times to
maintain the balance between creditors' and debtors' rights.,' Thus,
specific provisions wvithin the chapters have been altered to prevent
debtors from attempting to gain a benefit in one chapter where they
could not gain the benefit in another.' This part explores the various
28. See Countryman, supra note 24, at 228.
29. See id.
30. For instance, the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 allowed voluntary as well as

involuntary filings for merchants and non-merchants alike. See 5 Stat. 440,441 (1841).
The Act of 1867 permitted corporations to file for bankruptcy. See 14 Stat. 517 (1867).

31. See Countryman, supra note 24, at 226-28; Felsenfeld, supra note 25, at 137478.

32 See Felsenfeld, supra note 25, at 1378-84. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the
first to codify the debtor's fresh start as it exists today, by providing for discharge
without creditors' consent. See 30 Stat. 544, 550 (1898); see also Countryman, supra
note 24, at 228-32 (detailing the history of American bankruptcy law).
33. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of the
Code).

34. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a), 1141(d), 1228, 1328 (1994).
35. For example, section 522 allows a debtor certain exemptions of property from
the estate; section 524 provides for the debtor's discharge; section 541(a)(6) excepts
from the estate the post-petition service earnings of the individual debtor, and section
1328(a) grants the debtor in that chapter a broad discharge upon completion of plan
payments, while section 1328(b) provides a hardship discharge where the debtor is

unable to consummate the plan. See id. §§ 522,524, 541(a)(6), 1328(a)-(b).
36. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244 (1934).
37. See Felsenfeld, supra note 25, at 1380 ("The bankruptcy laws thus represent a

pendulum, constantly swinging between the two extremes, never reaching either and
never at rest.").

38. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (providing that individual debtors in Chapter
11 are unable to modify liens on their principal residences); see also First Federal

Bank of Cal. v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 227 B.R1 284, 290-91 & n.4 (B.A.P. 9th
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chapters of relief available to the individual debtor in bankruptcy

under the current Code. It then describes how courts calculate
property of the estate under section 541, a provision that is applicable
to all chapters under the Code.
A. A Comparisonof Chapters

1. Chapter 7
Individual debtors may file for relief under the Bankruptcy Code in
Chapters 7, 11, or 13. Chapter 7 provides both the individual and
corporate debtor with relief from debts through liquidation.39
Petitions under Chapter 7 may be filed voluntarily by the debtor or
involuntarily by the debtor's creditors. 40 A court-appointed trustee 4'

marshals all of the debtor's assets as of the petition date 42 and
liquidates the unencumbered, nonexempt assets to satisfy creditors'
claims.43 The debtor's obligations that are not satisfied by this
distribution are discharged.' Exceptions to discharge exist for certain
tax obligations, familial responsibilities, and other debts. 45 Barring
Cir. 1998) (discussing the amendment that codified the debtor's inability to alter or
"strip down" residential mortgages in Chapter 11). In Weinstein, creditors argued
that the debtors had not filed their plan in good faith because they sought to modify
the terms of the lien on their primary residence. However, the debtors had filed their
petition before the amendment was passed, and thus the modification was permitted.
See id.at 290-92.
39. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766. Chapter 7 may be initiated voluntarily or
involuntarily. See id. §§ 301, 303(a).
40. See id. §§ 301, 303.
41. In a Chapter 7 case, a trustee is always appointed. See id. § 701 (interim
trustee); id. § 702 (election of trustee).
42. Section 541 defines the property of the estate and includes in the estate all
equitable and legal interests of the debtor as of the petition date. In Chapter 7, courts
protect the individual debtor's fresh start by limiting the property of the estate to the
property that exists as of the filing date. See, e.g., In re Norris, 203 B.R. 463, 465 n.2
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1996) (holding that under Chapter 7, post-petition earnings are not
property of the estate under section 541(a)(6)); In re DeSoto, 181 B.R. 704, 713
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (same); In re Michaels, 157 B.R. 190, 196 n.6 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1993) (same).
43. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766; see also infra Part I.B for a discussion of what
constitutes property of the estate.
44. See 11 U.S.C. § 524. Section 524 governs the discharge of debts in bankruptcy
and applies to Chapters 7, 11, and 13. See id. § 103(a). Section 524 governs the effect
of a discharge of pre-petition, unsecured debts. Debts secured by liens are not
discharged under the Code because the security interest survives discharge. See 4
Collier on Bankruptcy 524.02[2][d] (1999). Discharge also protects the debtor by
enjoining future actions by creditors to enforce a debt that has been discharged under
this section. In a Chapter 7 case, the general discharge provision of the Code, section
524, works in conjunction with section 727, which governs denial of discharge in
Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 727.
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (listing all of the non-dischargable debts for the individual
in bankruptcy, including, for example, judgments for death or injury caused by the
debtor's driving while intoxicated).
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these restrictions, the individual debtor in Chapter 7 is free to enjoy
his fresh start.

2. Chapter 11
Chapter 11 contemplates reorganization of a business debtor while

allowing the debtor to remain in business.' The primary goal of
Chapter 11 is confirmation of a plan of reorganization." In enacting
Chapter 11, Congress did not envision its widespread use by consumer
debtors because of the complexity and expense of proposing a plan of
reorganization. However, Congress did not rule out the possibility
that Chapter 11 may provide the best option for certain individual
debtors.4 Although Chapter 11 is a vehicle predominately used by
corporations,4 9 the Supreme Court ruled in Toibb v. Radloff0 that
individuals not engaged in business are eligible to file for bankruptcy
under Chapter 11.51
Chapter 11 debtors are required to formulate a plan of
reorganization 2 and submit a disclosure statement that provides the
46. See id §§ 1101-1174. A liquidating Chapter 11 may also be contemplated. See
id. § 1123(b)(4).
47. See In re Powell, 187 B.R. 642, 647 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995): see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141 (detailing the effects of confirmation in Chapter 11); 7 Collier on Bankruptcy 1
1129.01 (1999) (same).
48. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 3 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5789
("Chapter 11, Reorganization, is primarily designed for businesses, although
individuals are eligible for relief under the chapter.").
49. See In re Townsend, 187 B.R. 230,232 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1995). But see iUsa
Hill Fenning & Craig A. Hart, Measuring Chapter11: The Real World of 500 Cases, 4
Am. Bankr. InsL L. Rev. 119, 139-42 (1996) (describing their study of Chapter 11
cases in Judge Fenning's chambers in the Central District of California and
concluding that individuals filed approximately 40% of the Chapter 11 petitions
during the course of the study).
50. 501 U.S. 157 (1991).
51. See id. at 166. The Court based its reasoning primarily on the plain language
of the Code. Section 109(d) states that only a person who qualifies as a debtor under
Chapter 7 may be a debtor under Chapter 11, with the exception of stockbrokers,
commodity brokers, and railroads. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d). Section 109(b) provides
for who may file under Chapter 7. See id. § 109(b). "Person" is a defined term under
the Code. Section 101(41) defines person to include individuals, partnerships, and
corporations. See id. § 101(41); Toibb, 501 U.S. at 160-61. Because individuals are
defined as persons and persons are eligible to file in Chapter 11, the Court concluded
that individuals could file under Chapter 11. The Supreme Court had granted
certiorari to resolve a split among the circuits, some holding individuals eligible to file
in Chapter 11 and others holding them ineligible. Compare Wamsganz v. Boatmen's
Bank of De Soto, 804 F.2d 503,505-06 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that an individual, not
engaged in business, was not eligible to file Chapter 11) with In re Moog, 774 F.2d
1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that individuals were eligible to file Chapter 11
whether or not engaged in business).
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (stating who may file a plan and when it may be filed); see
also id. § 1122 (stating standards of classification of claims); id. § 1123 (describing
what provisions the plan shall and may contain); id. §§ 1123(a)(2)-(4) (detailing that a
plan shall specify impaired and unimpaired classes of claims and provide for the same
treatment of each claim in a class unless the holder consents to less agreeable
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interested parties with sufficient information to make an informed
judgement about whether to vote to accept the plan.5 3 The plan of
reorganization in Chapter 11 can provide any terms that the debtor
wishes, including partial payment or extended payment of an existing
obligation. To consensually confirm a plan under section 1129(a), the
debtor must satisfy all of the requirements of that section.' 4 If a
creditor is not satisfied with the plan, the creditor may vote to reject
it.55 However, the provisions of Chapter 11 do not require that the
plan be funded from any particular source. Upon confirmation of a
plan in Chapter 11, the debtor receives the desired discharge and the
plan provisions supercede the prior obligations of the debtor.5 6 If the
debtor and his creditors are unable to reach a compromise on a plan
of reorganization, the debtor may be able to "cram down" his plan
upon certain of its creditors under section 1129(b).5 1
Several provisions of Chapter 11 present particularly difficult
obstacles for the debtor seeking plan confirmation. To confirm the

treatment); id. § 1124 (defining what constitutes an impairment to a claim or interest);
id. § 1129 (detailing confirmation standards).
53. See id. § 1125.
54. See id. § 1129(a). This section provides that the debtor must meet thirteen
requirements in order to consensually confirm a plan, most of which are irrelevant to
the individual debtor in Chapter 11. The provisions of section 1129(a) particularly
relevant are:
(3) The plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law.
(7) With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests(A)each holder of a claim or interest of such class(i) has accepted the plan; or
(ii) will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim or interest
property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than
the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor
were
liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date;
(11) Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation,
or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor
or
any
successor to the debtor under the plan,
unless
such
liquidation
or
reorganization is proposed in the plan.
Id. For discussion of other confirmation requirements under section 1129, see 7
Collier on Bankruptcy 1129.01-.03[13] (1999).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125.
56. See id. § 1141. Governed by section 523, the discharge for the individual in
Chapter 11 is slightly broader than that granted for the individual under Chapter 7,
because section 1141 also discharges "gap" claims arising in the period post-petition
but pre-confirmation.
57. Section 1129(b) supplies an exception to section 1129(a) by allowing the plan
to be confirmed even if some classes of creditors do not vote to accept the plan. See 11
U.S.C. § 1129; see also infra notes 83-92 and accompanying text (discussing nonconsensual confirmation, also known as "cram down").
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plan, the debtor must satisfy the best interest of creditors test*s must
be able to carry out the terms of his plan; 9 and must propose his plan
in good faith and in accordance with the law. 3 The debtor must also
satisfy the section that deals with conversion or dismissal of a Chapter
11 case for cause.61 These requirements will be discussed in turn.
The best interest of creditors test, contained in section 1129(a)(7),
protects creditors by ensuring that they will not receive less in a
Chapter 11 reorganization than they would receive in a Chapter 7
liquidation.' For purposes of applying the test, the estate is valued as
of the date the petition is filed. The value of the estate is then divided
among the creditors based on the priority of the creditors' claims.
This valuation is the minimum amount that creditors will receive.
This section applies only to members of impaired creditor classes 63
because unimpaired classes will receive full value on account of their
claims.64 If the court finds that impaired creditors would receive less
in Chapter 11, as provided for by the plan of reorganization, than they
would in a Chapter 7 liquidation, the plan is held unconfirmable.
The debtor must also demonstrate that the plan has a reasonable
likelihood of success. Section 1129(a)(11) concerns the feasibility of
the debtor's plan and requires a showing that: "[c]onfirmation of the
plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for
further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the
debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is
proposed in the plan."' The debtor's plan of reorganization that is
proffered to the court for approval need not guarantee success;
instead, the debtor need only submit a plan wvith which he is
reasonably able to comply.67 Courts have determined feasibility
according to "[w]hether the things which are to be done after
confirmation can be done as a practical matter under the facts. ... ",8
Factors that courts consider when determining feasibility include the
earning power of the debtor, the sufficiency of the debtor's capital
5& See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
59. See id. § 1129(a)(11).
60. See id § 1129(a)(3).
61. See id § 1112(b).
62. See id § 1129(a)(7). A debtor in Chapter 13 must also satisfy the best interest
of creditors test. See id § 1325(a)(4); see also infra notes 98-107 and accompanying
text (discussing Chapter 13).
63. A class of creditors is impaired if the debtor's plan proposes to alter the
creditors' rights on account of his claim. See 7 Collier on Bankruptcy I 1129.03171[a][b] (15th ed. 1999).
64. See id.
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
66. Id. § 1129(a)(11).
67. See In re Orlando Investors, L.P., 103 B.R. 593, 600 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
68. In re Ashton, 107 B.R. 670, 674 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1989) (citing In re Clarkson,
767 F.2d 417,420 (8th Cir. 1985)); see also it re Kemp 134 B.R. 413,415 (Bankr. E.D.
Cal. 1991) ("The test is whether the things which are to be done after confirmation
can be done as a practical matter under the facts.").
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managerial efficiency of the debtor, and
structure, credit availability,
69
market conditions.
Section 1129(a)(3) requires that "[t]he plan has been proposed in
good faith and not by any means forbidden by law."70 The good faith
requirement of section 1129(a)(3) has at least two factors. 71 First, the
plan must be "'proposed with honesty and good intentions,"' and
second, the debtor must have
"'a basis for expecting that a
7'
reorganization can be effected.'
Finally, section 1112(b) describes when a court may dismiss a case
or convert it to one under Chapter 7.73 Both creditors and debtors
may request a conversion or dismissal.74 Such actions are within the
discretion of the court and must be in the best interest of the creditors
and the estate. This section may be invoked by a party in interest or
sua sponte by the court at any time during the bankruptcy
proceeding.7" If a debtor is unable to confirm a plan of reorganization,
the court may convert or dismiss the case under section 1112(b).76
Courts have also interpreted this provision to require dismissal or
conversion where the debtor lacks the ability to formulate a plan or is
financially incapable of effectuating it.77 In addition, courts have
69. See In re Kemp, 134 B.R. at 416; In re Ashton, 107 B.R. at 674 ("[F]easibility
must be rooted in predictions based upon objective fact."); In re Orlando Investors,
103 B.R. at 600.
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).
71. See In re OrlandoInvestors, 103 B.R. at 598.
72. Id. at 598 (quoting In re Kobel, 751 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Manati
Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F.2d 284, 285 (2d Cir. 1935))). The court held that because
there was no indication that the debtor did not believe that his plan would not
succeed, the good faith requirement was met. See id. at 598-99. Although the debtor
in Orlando Investors was a partnership, the good faith standard of section 1129(a)(3)
is equally applicable to the individual Chapter 11 debtor.
73. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a)-(b).
74. See id.
75. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 117 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5903. Section 1112(b) provides:
on request of a party in interest or the United States trustee or bankruptcy
administrator.., the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case
under chapter 7 of this title or may dismiss a case under this chapter,
whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate, for cause,
including- (1) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a
reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation; (2) inability to effectuate a plan ....
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b).
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b); see also infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text
(discussing section 1112(b) issues in greater detail).
77. See, e.g., In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986)
(discussing conversion or dismissal under section 1112(b) for lack of good faith as
including "the bankruptcy court's on-the-spot evaluation of the debtor's financial
condition, motives, and the local financial realities"); In re Saleha, No. 93-00638, 1995
WL 128495, at *7 (Bankr. D. Idaho Mar. 10, 1995) (dismissing debtor's case under
section 1112(b) because five unconfirmed plans evidenced an inability to effectuate a
plan, which the court inferred to mean the debtor's "unwillingness to make the
financial sacrifices necessary to complete a Chapter 11 plan" despite having the
financial wherewithal to fund the plan).
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construed section 1112(b) to permit dismissal or conversion of

Chapter 11 cases that debtors have filed in bad faith.7' Although the
current Code does not explicitly require the debtor to file his petition
in good faith, it allows a court to dismiss a case "for cause." 9 Courts
have considered a bad faith filing to constitute "cause" justifying
dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 11 case.s A petition filed solely
to harass creditors is considered to have been filed in bad faith."'
Two additional concepts are important in Chapter 11 cases-cram
down and the new value exception. When a debtor in Chapter 11 is
unable to confirm a plan of reorganization with creditor consent, the
debtor will try to non-consensually confirm or "cram down" a plan
over dissenting creditors. To effect a non-consensual confirmation,
the debtor must meet the provisions in section 1129(a),2 except for
subsection (8). 83 In addition, the debtor must show that the plan does
not discriminate unfairly against dissenting classes and that such
classes are treated fairly and equitably under the plan.' Fair and
equitable treatment under section 1129(b) requires compliance with
the absolute priority rule.' The absolute priority rule requires either
that the debtor pay the unsecured creditors' claims in full,"' or that
subordinated creditors and shareholders receive or retain no property
78. See, e-g., In re McCormick Rd. Assocs., 127 B.R. 410, 412-17 (N.D. 111.1991)
(discussing factors of bad faith filings and holding that the debtor filed a Chapter I1
petition in bad faith); In re Mogul, 17 B.R. 680, 681-82 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982)
(conceding that the Code does not require the debtor to file his petition in good faith,
yet converting the case to Chapter 7 based on the "totality of the circumstances").
79. See, e.g., In re Mogul, 17 B.R. at 682 ("[Glood faith must be viewed as an
implied prerequisite for a debtor's ability of obtaining relief under this Chapter."); see
also Janet A. Flaccus, Have Eight Circuits Shorted? Good Faith and Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Petitions,67 Am. Bankr. LJ. 401, 401-17 (1993) (discussing the legislative
history behind section 1112(b) and the fact that the Code does not include a good
faith filing requirement).
80. See, e.g., In re Little Creek, 779 F.2d at 1072; In re Martin, 51 B.R. 490, 493-95
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985). These cases were decided before the Supreme Court's
decision in Toibb v. Radloff, which established the legal validity of Chapter 11 filings
by individual debtors who are not engaged in business. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S.
157, 166 (1991). Despite the legal uncertainty, the courts ruled that such individuals'
filings under Chapter 11 were insufficient, by themselves, to constitute cause for
dismissal. See In re Little Creek, 779 F.2d at 1072; In re Martin, 51 B.R. at 493-95.
81. See, e.g., In re Mogul, 17 B.R. at 682 (holding that because the debtor had no
possibility of effectuating a plan, the "entire proceeding was instituted solely for the
purpose of delay and harassment" and therefore should be dismissed).
82 See supra notes 54-72 (discussing the consensual confirmation standards under
section 1129(a)).
83. Subsection (8) provides: "[wlith respect to each class of claims or interests(A) such class has accepted the plan; or (B) such class is not impaired under the
plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8); see also supra note 54 (describing section 1129(a)).
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 1416 (1999). For a complete discussion of
non-consensual confirmation, see 7 Collier on Bankruptcy T 1129.04-.08 (15th ed.
1999).
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
86. See icL § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i).
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under the plan "on account of such junior claim or interest any
property. '
In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co.,' the Supreme Court
alluded in dicta to an exception to the absolute priority rule, known
today as the "new value exception." 89 The new value exception
allows
the
business
debtor's
subordinated
claim-holders
(shareholders) to retain an interest in the reorganized company, even
though unsecured creditors with greater priority have not been paid in
full, if the subordinated claim-holders make a new and substantial
contribution of "money or in money's worth" that is reasonably
equivalent to the new interests obtained in the reorganized debtor?
In interpreting this judicially created exception, the Supreme Court in
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers91 held that the new value
exception could not be invoked where the proposed money's worth
was "sweat equity"-future labor on the debtor's farm.' The Court
found that a "promise to contribute future labor, management, or
expertise [is] [in]sufficent to qualify for the... exception to the
absolute priority rule."'93 According to the Court, subordinate claimholders may invoke the new value exception only where the proposed
new money, or money's worth, is tangible and the contribution is the
reasonable equivalent of the interest retained.94
Without deciding whether the new value exception survived the
enactment of the 1978 Code, the Supreme Court in Bank of America
National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 North La Salle Street
Partnership95 recently held that an exclusive opportunity to propose a
plan of reorganization in which a new value contribution by old equity
87. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii); see also 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership,119 S. Ct. at
1416 (applying the standards set out by section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)).
88. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
89. See id. at 121-22. The passage, oft-quoted, reads:
It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under which stockholders
may participate in a plan of reorganization of an insolvent debtor.... [W]e
believe that to accord 'the creditor of his full right of priority against the
corporate assets' where the debtor is insolvent, the stockholder's
participation must be based on a contribution in money or in money's worth,
reasonably equivalent in view of all the circumstances to the participation of
the stockholder.
Id.; see also 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership,119 S. Ct. at 1417 (discussing the absolute
priority rule and new value exception without deciding if the new value exception
survived the 1978 Bankruptcy Act's enactment).
90. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202-09 (1988) (citing
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1939)). The Court in
Ahlers questioned the continued viability of the new value corollary because Congress
did not specifically include this exception in the 1978 Code. See Ahlers, 485 U.S. at
205-06.
91. 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
92. See id. at 204-05.
93. Id. at 204.
94. See id.
95. 119 S.Ct. 1411 (1999).
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is exchanged for an equity interest in the reorganized debtor was an
interest in property retained by shareholders in contravention of
section 1129(b)(2)(B). 96 As such, the debtors could not cram down
the plan on their creditors because outside parties were not given the

opportunity to bid.97

3.

Chapter 13

In contrast to Chapters 7 and 11, only individual debtors may seek
Chapter 13 relief.98 To be eligible for Chapter 13, the debtor must
have a regular source of income and debt no greater than specified
amounts.99 Chapter 13 calls for a readjustment of the debtor's
obligations and requires that the debtor file a plan of reorganization
with the court1 0° within 15 days of filing for bankruptcy.u' Chapter 13
discharges an individual's debts, not upon confirmation, but only after
the completion of payments under the plan."
Furthermore, Chapter 13 compels the debtor to make his future
income available for distribution in execution of the plan. 3 Although
creditors do not vote on a Chapter 13 plan, they may object to plan
confirmation on the grounds, inter alia, that it is not proposed in good
faith, not feasible, or does not satisfy the best interest of creditors
test."" If an unsecured creditor objects to plan confirmation, the
96. Section 1129(b)(2)(B) is the absolute priority rule.
97. See 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership,119 S. Ct. at 1423.
98. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1994). Individuals with sole proprietorships are
also eligible to file under Chapter 13. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 318-20 (1977)
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 5963, 6275-77.
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). Section 109(e) describes who may be a debtor under
Chapter 13 and provides for maximum debt ceilings of S269,250 for noncontingent,
liquidated, unsecured debt and $807,750 for noncontingent, liquidated, secured debt.
These limits also represent the aggregate limits for the debtor and his spouse.
Recently, the Code was amended to reflect inflation; these debt limits are generally
subject to adjustment every three years according to changes in the Consumer Price
Index. See id § 104 (supp. IV 1998). "Regular income" is income that the debtor
receives with regularity and is unrelated to the type or nature of work that the debtor
performs to earn her income. See In re Antoine, 208 B.R 17, 19-21 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1997).
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 1321 (only the debtor may file a plan); see also id. § 1325(a)(3)
(plan must be proposed in good faith).
101. See Fed. Bankr. R. 3015(b).
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328.
103. See id. § 1322(a)(1) ("The plan shall-(1) provide for the submission of all or
such portion of future earnings or other future income of the debtor.... ."); see also
id. § 1306(a) ("Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified in
section 541 of this title--(1) all property ... that the debtor acquires after the
commencement of the case... and (2) earnings from services performed by the
debtor after the commencement of the case ....); supra Part I.B (discussing property
of the estate.) Congress permits Chapter 13 to be initiated only voluntarily, so as to
avoid any violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1;
11 U.S.C. § 303(a) ("An involuntary case may be commenced only under chapter 7 or
11 of this title." (emphasis supplied)).
104. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1); supra notes 62-64; see also 8 Collier on Bankruptcy
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debtor must either pay the claim in full or make his future disposable
income available to fund the dissenting creditor's claim for at least
three years.105 The Code defines disposable income as income that is
not reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the debtor
or the debtor's dependents.0 6 At the time of confirmation, the
bankruptcy court must determine whether the debtor's proposed
expenditures are necessary for his maintenance and support." 7
Both Chapters 11 and 13 allow the debtor to financially restructure
itself. 18
Both chapters require the debtor to file a plan of
reorganization with the court," and both have similar plan
requirements.11 For example, plans proposed under either chapter
must treat all claim-holders in a particular class equally,"' and in both
chapters, the plan must be proposed in good faith."' Both chapters
also apply the "best interest of creditors" test" 3 and require that the
plan's implementation be reasonably feasible." 4
Chapter 13 differs from Chapter 11 in that the former may only be
initiated voluntarily by the debtor, while the latter may be initiated
either voluntarily or involuntarily."' Whereas under Chapter 11, the
1325.01-.09 (1999) (discussing the other confirmation standards of Chapter 13).
105. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
106. See id. § 1325(b)(2)(A).
107. See, e.g., In re Ehret, 238 B.R. 85, 87-88 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999) (finding private
school tuition of $2000 a month excessive); In re Walsh, 224 B.R. 231, 237-38 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1998) (denying confirmation because of excessive car payments); In re Dick,
222 B.R. 189, 190-91 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (denying confirmation because retention
by debtor of vacation home was unnecessary); In re Wyant, 217 B.R. 585, 587 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1998) (holding that expenditures for care of aging horses and dogs was not
necessary).
108. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 9-13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5795-99; see also supra Parts I.A.2, I.A.3 (comparing Chapters 11 and 13).
109. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (providing who may file a plan under Chapter 11),
with id. § 1321 (providing who may file a plan under Chapter 13).
110. Compare id. § 1123 (stating the provisions that the plan shall and may
contain), with id. § 1322 (same provision under Chapter 13).
111. Compare id. § 1123(a)(4) (providing that each claim in a class receive the same
treatment), with id. § 1322(a)(3) (same provision under Chapter 13).
112. See In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 425 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing
Chapter 11 and 13 and the requirement in both chapters that the debtor propose the
plan of reorganization in good faith).
113. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), 1325(a)(4). The "best interest of creditors"
test is a minimum payment requirement that the creditors not receive less in Chapter
11 or 13 than they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See id.; see also supra note 58 and
accompanying text (discussing the best interest of creditors test).
114. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (requiring that the debtor be able to carry
out the terms of his plan), with id. § 1325(a)(6) (same). The test for feasibility is
whether the debtor is able to effectuate his plan as proposed. See In re Keach, 225
B.R. 264, 269-70 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998) (finding a Chapter 13 plan unfeasible because
the plan was dependent on a 37% increase in debtor's business); In re Turpen, 218
B.R. 908, 915-16 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1998) (holding a Chapter 13 plan unconfirmable
because the debtor could not establish his capacity to obtain credit as proposed in his
plan); In re Ashton, 107 B.R. 670, 674-75 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989).
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (providing that an involuntary case may only be
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creditors vote to accept or reject the plan, Chapter 13 provides for no
such vote on the plan."16 In addition, if creditors object to plan
confirmation in a Chapter 13 proceeding, the debtor must provide that
the objecting creditor's claims will be paid in full, or the debtor must
contribute his disposable income for three years to repay the objecting
creditor's claims.1 7 Chapter 11 does not contain a disposable income

test provision,118 under which the individual debtor would be required
to contribute his disposable income to fund his plan.
An individual debtor may wish to file under Chapter 11 instead of
Chapter 13 for a variety of reasons. Unlike in a Chapter 11 case, a
debtor is ineligible to file under Chapter 13 if he has accumulated
debts above the limits imposed by Chapter 13 or if he does not have a
regular source of income.119 A debtor may also wish to file under
Chapter 11 to avoid the "disposable income test," thus shielding his
post-petition income.120 Although Chapter 11 should be available to
individual debtors, it should not exist as a safe haven from application
of Chapter 13's disposable income test.
B.

Section 541-Propertyof the Estate

The purpose of adjudicating bankruptcy cases is to pay creditors'
claims from the debtor's pool of assets. In order to administer those
assets, an estate is created when a bankruptcy petition is filed. 2 1 The
bankruptcy estate is thus the compilation of the debtor's assets as of
the filing date. Section 541, which applies to all chapters of the
Code, m provides a broad inclusive list of property that becomes part
of the debtor's estatey2 wherever such property is located and by
commenced under Chapter 7 or 11). An involuntary case is commenced by the
debtor's creditors. See id. § 303(b).
116. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) (stating that a creditor may vote to accept or
reject the plan in Chapter 11), with id. § 1325(b)(1) (providing that the trustee or
holder of an allowed unsecured claim may object to confirmation).
117. See id. § 1325(b)(1)(A)-(B); see also supra notes 103-07 and accompanying
text (describing the disposable income test).
11& See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174. Compare id. § 1325(b)(1)(A)-(B) (describing the
disposable income test).
119. See id. § 109(e) (describing who may be a debtor under Chapter 13); see also
supra Part I.A3.
120. See Tatge & Meier, supra note 17, at 256; see also supra notes 103-07 and
accompanying text (discussing the disposable income test). Compare 11 U.S.C. §
1325(b)(1)(B) (including the post-petition earnings of the Chapter 13 debtor), with id.
§ 1141 (failing to provide for the inclusion of debtor's post-petition earnings).
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). Section 541 applies generally to Chapters 7, 11, and 13
of the Code. It also applies to Chapter 12 (family farmer with regular income
reorganization). See id. § 103(a). Chapter 12 applies only to a particular type of
debtor, the family farmer, and is beyond the scope of this Note.
122. See id. § 103(a).
123. All interests in property that the debtor possesses as of the petition date
become property of the estate, including any interests jointly possessed with the
debtor's spouse, any interest in property that the trustee recovers for the estate, any
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whomever it is held. 124 Property of the estate includes all legal and
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case."z Also included are any interests jointly possessed by the
debtor and the debtor's spouse,126 and certain interests the debtor
acquires within 180 days after the filing that would have been property
of the estate had the interest existed at the time of filing.12 7 Moreover,

property of the estate includes any interest that the estate, as
distinguished from the debtor, acquires post-commencement.

128

Section 541(a)(6) provides that property of the estate includes
"[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of
the estate, except such as are earningsfrom services performed by an
individual debtor after the commencement of the case."129 This

italicized portion of the statute is known as the "earnings exception,"
and excepts from the estate the future earnings of the individual
debtor. 30
interest in property received from an inheritance, divorce, or life insurance policy that
the debtor acquires within 180 days of filing, and any interest in property that the
estate acquires after the commencement of the case. See id. § 541(a)(1)-(a)(7).
124. See id. § 541(a). The trustee or debtor-in-possession has the power to avoid
certain transfers and reclaim property of the estate. See id. § 541(a)(3) (including in
the estate "[a]ny interest in property that the trustee recovers under section 329(b),
363(n), 543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title").
125. See id. § 541(a)(1). The individual debtor is permitted to claim exemptions
from property of the estate under section 522. See id. § 522. Depending on where the
debtor files, the debtor may choose between the federal exemptions listed in the Code
and state exemptions. Certain states have opted-out of the federal exemption
scheme, thereby forcing the debtor to take the state exemptions together with certain
other federal exemptions. See Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 308-14 (1991) (holding
that state bankruptcy exemptions should be treated the same as federal exemptions
and discussing Florida's opt-out exemptions). Federal exemptions include, inter alia,
$16,150 for residential property and $425 in household goods and clothing. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 104, 522 (1994 & supp. IV 1998). Exempt property is excluded from the
bankruptcy estate and is therefore unavailable to satisfy creditors' claims.
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2).
127. See id. § 541(a)(5). This subsection contemplates interests such as
inheritances. See id. § 541(a)(5)(A).
128. Section 541(a)(6) includes "[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of
or from property of the estate," and section 541(a)(7) includes "[a]ny interest in
property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case." See id. §§
541 (a)(6), 541 (a)(7).
129. See id. § 541(a)(6) (emphasis added). The italicized portion of section
541(a)(6) is often referred to as the earnings exception. See, e.g., Susan Gummow,
Earnings Exception, 98 Com. L.J. 379, 393 (1993) (arguing that the definition of
earnings under section 541(a)(6) depends on the facts of the particular case). But see
Louis M. Phillips & Tanya Martinez Shively, Ruminations on Propertyof the EstateDoes Anyone Know Why a Debtor's Postpetition Earnings, Generated by Her Own
EarningCapacity,Are Not Propertyof the Bankruptcy Estate?, 58 La. L. Rev. 623, 645
(1998) (arguing that the earnings exception does not arise in section 541(a)(6) alone,
but is a product of the interplay between sections 541(a)(1), 541(a)(6), and
365(c)(1)).
130. Several property interests are excluded from the estate. Section 541(b)(1)
excludes from property of the estate any interest possessed by the debtor that may be
exercised solely for the benefit of another. For example, if the debtor holds property
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Although section 541 should be applied consistently to all types of
debtors under any chapter of the Code,'' the purposes of each
chapter and the nature of the specific debtor tend to influence what
the courts ultimately consider to be property of the estate.' - For
example, in a Chapter 7 liquidation, 33 courts do not strain to interpret
section 541(a)(6) and therefore exclude the future earnings of the
debtor, thus preserving the debtor's fresh start. " Under Chapter 13,
the property of the estate includes all of the property specified in
section 541, whether acquired pre- or post-petition, and also
encompasses earnings from services performed by the debtor after
commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings.'35
Determining the property of the estate in a Chapter 11 proceeding
is more complicated for the individual debtor because of the section
541(a)(6) earnings exception.3 6 To preserve the individual debtor's
fresh start,137 most courts have refused to include post-petition
earnings from services performed by the debtor in the Chapter 11
estate. Thus, although the earnings generated by a sole proprietorship
are included -within the estate, the personal earnings of the sole
proprietor, such as a salary, are excluded. This distinction results
from the courts' deference to both the policy of preserving the
debtor's fresh start"3 and to the principles of the Thirteenth
Amendment. 39 The classification of property of the estate in a
Chapter 11 case involving an individual who does not own a business
in trust for another, the trust corpus will not become part of the estate. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(b)(1); see, e.g., In re McCafferty, 96 F.3d 192, 197-99 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that because the debtor possessed only bare legal title to pension benefits, while
debtor's ex-spouse possessed equitable interest, only legal title passed to the estate).
131. See 11 U.S.C. § 103(a).
132. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 164 (1991) ("[Dlifferences in the
requirements and protections of each chapter reflect Congress' appreciation that
various approaches are necessary to address effectively the disparate situations of
debtors seeking protection under the Code.").
133. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766; see also supra Part I.A.1 (detailing Chapter 7).
134. See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text (discussing the individual
debtor's fresh start).
135. See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a); supra note 103.
136. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6); see also supra Part 11 (examining the distinction
between the earnings of the sole proprietor and his business).
137. See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text (discussing the debtor's fresh
start).
138. The post-petition earnings of the individual debtor are not included in the
estate, thereby giving the debtor a financial means with which to start his new life. See
infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text (discussing the fresh start).
139. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. The
argument is that by including the personal earnings of the individual debtor in the
estate, the Thirteenth Amendment's proscription against involuntary servitude may
be violated because the debtor would be working for the benefit of his creditors. See
infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text (discussing the Thirteenth Amendment).
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is similar to classification of property of the estate under Chapter 7.140
Courts generally do not include the post-petition earnings of the
individual debtor who is not engaged in business as property of the
estate in either Chapter 7 or 11.14
The fresh start should preclude courts from including in the
debtor's estate the post-petition earnings of the individual Chapter 11
debtor. However, courts' interpretations of which earnings become
property of the estate for these debtors are inconsistent, often varying
because the debtor is engaged in business as a sole proprietor. Part II
of this Note explores courts' conflicting interpretations of property of
the estate under section 541 and identifies the factors behind their
reasoning.
II. DEBTORS IN CHAPTER 11: VARYING INTERPRETATIONS OF
SECTION

541(A)(6) 142

This part revisits the fresh start in the context of post-petition
earnings, and examines courts' interpretations of those earnings that
are deemed property of the estate for both individual Chapter 11
debtors engaged in business and those who are not. As this Note
argues, the determination of whether post-petition earnings should be
included in an individual Chapter 11 debtor's estate is unnecessary
because there is no requirement in Chapter 11 that the debtor fund his
plan with estate property. As discussed in Part III, although many
courts exclude from the estate the post-petition earnings of the
individual Chapter 11 debtor, they require the debtor to use these
funds in determining whether the debtor's plan is confirmable.
A principal policy consideration underlying the Bankruptcy Code is
the debtor's fresh start. 143 The fresh start is the debtor's ability to
resume his life free from the financial difficulties of his past, 44 and is
achieved through the discharge of the debtor's debts after he has paid
the amount that he is able to pay. 4 5 Courts sometimes exclude from
the debtor's estate the post-petition earnings of the individual debtor
in order to protect this fresh start. In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,14 6 the
140. Section 541, defining the property of the estate, applies to all of the chapters
of the Code and should be analyzed similarly in each chapter. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 103(a),
541.
141. See In re Bemish, 200 B.R. 408, 408-09 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding postpetition earnings are not included in the Chapter 7 estate); In re Fernandez, 97 B.R.
262, 262 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) (same under Chapter 11); see also supra notes 143-51
and accompanying text (discussing the debtor's fresh start).
142. Section 541(a)(6) includes in the estate "[piroceeds, product, offspring, rents,
or profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are earnings from services
performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(6).
143. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 7 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,5793.
144. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244 (1934).
145. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
146. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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Supreme Court preserved the individual debtor's fresh start by
refusing to allow a wage assignment to survive the debtor's discharge,

noting that the purpose of the fresh start would be frustrated if the
individual debtor were forced to contribute future earnings to pay

debts.147 As the Supreme Court stressed:

[The] purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by
the courts as being of public as well as private interest, in that it
gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor.., a new opportunity in
life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure
and discouragement of pre-existing debt."

Acknowledging the importance of preserving the debtor's fresh
start, the Supreme Court in Segal v. Rochelle 49 developed a test to
determine which of the debtor's post-petition earnings become
property of the estate. 5 ' According to the Court, if the property "is
sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past and so little entangled
with the bankrupts' ability to make an unencumbered fresh start.., it
should be regarded as 'property' [of the estate]."''
Another consideration that has influenced courts' narrow
interpretations of post-petition earnings that are includable as
property of the estate is the Thirteenth Amendment's proscription

against involuntary servitude.1 - Consistent with the Thirteenth
Amendment, some bankruptcy courts will not compel a debtor to
work for his creditors, and thus, refuse to include in the estate the
post-petition earnings of the individual Chapter 11 debtor.Y3
147. See id. at 245.
148. Id. at 244 (citations omitted).
149. 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
150. See id at 379-80.
151. Id. at 380. The issue before the Court was whether the loss-carryback tax
refunds of the debtor's partnership belonged to the estate or to the debtors. The
Court concluded that the loss-carryback was "property" under section 70a(5) of the
Act (section 70a(5) was the predecessor of section 541 of the Code) because a
contingent or "postponed enjoyment does not disqualify an interest as 'property'" as
defined under that section of the Act. Id. at 380.
152. The Thirteenth Amendment provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
153. See, e.g., In re Markman, 5 B.R. 196, 198-99 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (asserting
in dicta that had Chapter 13 required future income contribution for a mandatory
period of time, it may have violated the Thirteenth Amendment in that "compulsory
service in payment of a debt" is essentially involuntary servitude). But see Toibb v.
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991) (holding that "Congress' concern about imposing
involuntary servitude on a Chapter 13 debtor is not relevant to a Chapter 11
reorganization" because Chapter 11 does not contain a provision including the
debtor's future earnings); In re Angobaldo, 160 B.R. 140, 150 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993)
(finding the Chapter 11 debtor's Thirteenth Amendment argument unpersuasive
because the debtor had his choice of chapters under the Code and that he -has not
been compelled to labor for another against his will in the sense that there is
involuntary servitude").
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Aside from policy considerations such as the fresh start and the
Thirteenth Amendment's proscription against involuntary servitude,
another factor courts take into account in determining the property of
the estate for the individual Chapter 11 debtor is whether the debtor
is engaged in business. Because the earnings exception in section
541(a)(6) excludes from the estate only that income that is earned
from services performed by the individual debtor,'-4 courts have
questioned which property of the individual Chapter 11 debtor
becomes property of the estate based on the source of the earnings,
and have differentiated the debtor engaged in business from the
debtor who is not.
When an individual debtor files for bankruptcy, a new entity is
created: the estate.155 Property of the estate is comprised of the
debtor's legal and equitable interests in property as of the petition's
filing date. 56 The post-petition earnings of the individual debtor are
not considered property of the Chapter 11 estate 57 because they do
not exist as property on the petition date.1 58 Because the individual
does not have a current interest in his future income, neither does the
estate.1 59 By contrast, the post-petition earnings of a corporation, the
typical Chapter 11 debtor, do constitute property of the estate. These
earnings derive from the assets of the corporation-assets that are
property of the debtor-corporation's Chapter 11 estate as of the date
of filing its petition."6 Also included is any interest in property that
the estate acquires after commencement of the case.1 61 Therefore, the
post-petition income of the corporate debtor is deemed property of
the estate.
Where the Chapter 11 debtor is a sole proprietor, the assets of the
sole proprietorship become property of the estate. 62 When equating
the Chapter 11 sole proprietorship with a Chapter 11 corporation,
most courts conclude that any post-petition income generated by the
sole proprietorship's business assets constitutes property of the estate,
154.
155.
156.
157.
1998).

See
See
See
See

11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1994).
id. § 541(a).
id.; see also supra Part I.B for a discussion of property of the estate.
Roland v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 223 B.R. 499, 502 (Bankr. E.D. Va.

158. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)-(a)(7); see also Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379
(1966) ("[F]uture wages of the bankrupt do not constitute 'property' at the time of
bankruptcy .... "); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 243 (1934) ("The earning

power of an individual is the power to create property; but it is not translated into
property within the meaning of the bankruptcy act until it has brought earnings into
existence."); In re Fernandez, 97 B.R. 262, 262 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989) ("An
individual chapter 11 debtor's postpetition [sic] compensation ... is not part of the
debtor's chapter 11 estate."); In re Cooley, 87 B.R. 432,438 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).
159. See supra note 158.
160. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)-(a)(7).

161. See id. § 541(a)(7).
162. See infra notes 165-206 and accompanying text (discussing individual Chapter
11 debtors engaged in business).
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but that any income relating to the post- petition services of the
individual debtor is not property of the estate.6'' In the case of the
individual debtor in Chapter 11 who is not operating a sole
proprietorship, there is no need to engage in this bifurcated analysis
because there is no business to reorganize, and section 541(a)(6) can
be interpreted literally without difficulty.' 6'
Courts that have addressed the issue of whether post-petition
earnings of the Chapter 11 debtor who is a sole proprietor become
part of the bankruptcy estate under section 541(a)(6) have applied a
plethora of different rationales to reach their conclusions.1'5 As
noted, the majority of these courts have held that post-petition income
derived from personal services rendered by the individual debtor are
excluded from the estate, while post-petition income derived from the
sole proprietor's business assets are included within the debtor's
estate.1" A minority of courts include in the estate all of the debtor's
post-petition earnings, regardless of the source of the income. 67
The majority approach purports to accord section 541(a)(6) its plain
meaning, 168 yet the application of the section 541(a)(6) exception is
somewhat inconsistent1 69depending on how courts define the term
"services performed."
The Ninth Circuit's leading case, In re
FitzSimmons, holds that "the earnings exception applies only to
services performed personally by an individual debtor."'
In
163. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6); see also Leif M. Clark, Chapter11-Does One Size
Fit All?, 4 Am. Bankr. Inst. L Rev. 167, 188, 190, nn. 129-30 (1996) (discussing the
unique situation of the individual Chapter 11 debtor and the problems of defining "in
business"); infra Part II. But see infra notes 185-200 (detailing cases that hold that
post-petition earnings of the individual debtor are property of the estate).
164. An analogy can be made to a Chapter 7 corporate case, where liquidation
terminates the business and precludes any possibility of reorganization by the
corporation.
165. The two principal rationales are the debtor's fresh start and avoidance of a
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. See supra notes 142-55 and accompanying
text (discussing the debtor's fresh start and the Thirteenth Amendment).
166. See, e.g., In re Cooley, 87 B.R. 432, 439 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988) (holding that
the burden of proof is on creditors to distinguish between debtor's and business
earnings); FitzSimmons v. Walsh (In re FitzSimmons), 725 F.2d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir.
1984) (remanding case for determination of the debtor's personal service earnings).
167. See In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 755-56 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993); In re
Herberman, 122 B.R. 273,278-79 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
168. Section 541(a)(6) includes in the estate "Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or
profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are earnings from services
performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(6).
169. See, e.g., Gummow, supra note 129, at 381-93 (analyzing the section 541 cases
and concluding that defining earnings under section 541(a)(6) depends on the specific
factual situation).
170. In re FitzSinwzons, 725 F.2d at 1211 (emphasis in the original). The Ninth
Circuit added the word "personally" to section 541(a)(6), which excludes from the
estate earnings from the services performed by the individual debtor after the
commencement of the case. See also supra notes 129, 142 and accompanying text
(discussing the text of section 541 (a)(6)).
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FitzSimmons, the debtor, an owner and operator of a sole
proprietorship law practice, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.
The court maintained that the proceeds from the law firm that were
not personally earned by the debtor became property of the estate
and remanded the case for a determination of those earnings.' 7' The
FitzSimmons court based its holding on the presence of the "earnings
exception" in the provisions of Chapter 11 and its absence in the
provisions of Chapter 13.172 Because the provisions of Chapter 11 are
silent on the inclusion of the future earnings of the individual debtor,
the court refused to include those earnings in the estate. The court
also rejected the argument that section 541(a)(6) excludes from the
estate all post-petition earnings of a sole proprietorship, asserting that
this interpretation of the statute would "preclude operation of sole
proprietorships under Chapter 11.''173 Without the earnings generated
by the law firm, as distinct from the earnings of the debtor, there
would be no estate to reorganize. 174
In re Altchek 75 adopted a substantially similar approach to
FitzSimmons, except that there, Judge Schwartzberg found that he
"[was] bound to uphold the laws as set forth in the Bankruptcy Code,"
and refused to interpret the exception in section 541(a)(6) to mean
"personal services" as the Ninth Circuit had done in FitzSimmons.7 6
The court, however, determined that the estate consisted of prepetition property of the debtor and all proceeds and profits that
accrue to the estate post-petition,
but not the post-petition earnings
77
from the services of the debtor.1
One other variation to the majority approach was applied in In re
Cooley.178 In Cooley, the debtor, a doctor with a five-surgeon practice,
filed for Chapter 11 relief. The court examined the case law
interpreting section 541(a)(6) and concluded that a valuation of the
179
debtor's services was neither practical nor required by the statute.
171. See In re FitzSimmons, 725 F.2d at 1211-12.
172. See id. at 1211 ("If Congress had intended to make the earnings exception
inapplicable to Chapter 11 cases, we believe that it would have done so explicitly, as it
did in § 1306."); see also supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text (comparing
Chapters 11 and 13).
173. In re FitzSimmons, 725 F.2d at 1211.
174. See id. This reasoning of the FitzSimmons court, while true to the language of
section 541(a)(6), is inconsistent with the confirmation-standard cases discussed infra
Part III.
175. 124 B.R. 944 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
176. Id. at 955 (emphasis supplied); supra note 170 and accompanying text
(emphasizing that the FitzSimmons court interpolated the word "personal" into
section 541(a)(6)). In practice, the approaches used in Altchek and FitzSimmons
result in the same separation of income generated by the individual from that
generated by the business.
177. See In re Altchek, 124 B.R. at 955.
178. 87 B.R. 432 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).
179. See id. at 439. In fact, the court held that, "[tihe earnings exception was not
drafted in terms of 'reasonable compensation' of an individual's services or in terms
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Distinguishing FitzSimmons, the court focused on the fact that the
earnings exception existed not only to differentiate the individual
debtor from the estate, but more important, to avoid any potential
conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment.Y° What constitutes
property of the individual Chapter 11 debtor's estate, the court held,
depended in part on whether the debtor contemplated reorganization
or liquidation.'
Notably, the Cooley court placed the burden of
proof on the moving creditor to provide evidence that the earnings in
question were property of the estate and not of the debtor. ' Under
this interpretation, all earnings of the sole proprietorship were
excluded from the estate, unless the creditor could prove that the
income was either derived from property of the estate or that the
debtor did not earn the income by rendering his servicesY,
A distinct minority of courts interprets section 541 very
differently." In re Herberman' is typical of courts taking this
minority approach. The court in In re Herberman treated an
individual Chapter 11 debtor, who owned a sole proprietorship, as a
corporation and granted the debtor a salary, similar to what the CEO

of 'services personally performed' which might have suggested a directive towards
valuing an individual's 'hands-on' contributions in the form of services." Id. at 439-40.
180. See id. at 440; see also In re Molina y Vedia, 150 B.R. 393, 398-400 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1992) (discussing section 541(a)(6) and naming the Thirteenth
Amendment's proscription against involuntary servitude as a policy behind
Congress's exclusion of post-petition earnings of individual debtors in Chapters 7 and
11 because of possible involuntarily filings); supra notes 152-53 (discussing the
Thirteenth Amendment).
181. The estate in a Chapter 11 liquidation case, which is similar to a Chapter 7
liquidation, will include less property than the estate in a Chapter 11 proposed
reorganization because property in a liquidation case will not be subject to the
provisions of section 541 regarding property acquired after the petition is filed. See 11
U.S.C. § 541 (1994) (property of the estate); id. § 1123 (providing for a liquidating
Chapter 11 plan); In re Cooley, 87 B.R. at 440; see also supra Part I.A.2 (describing
Chapter 11 generally).
182. See In re Cooley, 87 B.R. at 441. Initially, the debtor must prove that -(1)
[she] is an individual, (2) who performs services, (3) which generates earnings, (4)
post petition," and then the creditor must prove that the earnings belong to the estate.
Id
183. See id. at 439; see also In re Molina y Vedia, 150 B.R. at 397402. The court in
Molina y Vedia, adhering to the reasoning in Cooley, reached a contrary conclusion
because the doctor-debtor in Molina y Vedia employed no other physicians and his
support staff did not generate any income for the estate. In fact, the court in Molina y
Vedia held that the creditors did not carry their burden of proof, and as such, all of
the earnings from the debtor's medical practice were excluded from the estate. See id.
at 402-03.
184. See In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 750 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993); In re Herberman,
122 B.R. 273,288 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
185. 122 B.R. 273. In this case, the court considered whether earnings generated by
the debtor's sole proprietorship during the period between filing the petition and
confirmation of the plan of reorganization should be classified as property of the
estate under section 541(a)(6). See id. at 275, 288; see also Inre Harp, 166 B.R_ at 750
n.10 (citing with approval and folloing the reasoning of Herberian).
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of a corporate debtor would receive.

86

The court reasoned that post-

petition earnings of the individual debtor were includable as property
of the estate under section 541(a)(7),'1 which includes in the estate
"[a]ny interest in property that the estate acquires after the
commencement of the case,"'" and that the section 541(a)(6)
exception applied only to earnings that were "[p]roceeds, product,
offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the estate.... "189
Because the earnings were the result of the debtor's post-petition

personal

services,

the

court

found

the

earnings

exception

inapplicable. 19°
The estate in Herberman thus included everything that the estate,
including the debtor, acquired post-commencement. Because the
post-petition earnings of the debtor that derived from the debtor's
practice were not proceeds, product, or offspring of property of the
estate, they were not excepted and were therefore included in the
estate under section 541(a)(7). 91 The court reasoned that the salary
the debtor draws from managing the estate is what is protected by the
earnings exception of section 541(a)(6). 19 The Herberman court
asserted that courts should administer Chapter 11 uniformly to all
types of debtors, individuals and corporations alike. 93 The court
disposed of any Thirteenth Amendment issues by noting that the
debtor had filed his94 petition voluntarily, thereby avoiding a
constitutional problem.
186. See In re Herberman, 122 B.R. at 287-88.
187. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) (1994).
188. In re Herberman, 122 B.R. at 278 (emphasis in case) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541
(a)(7)).
189. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6)).
190. See id.
191. See id. at 278-80. This triple negative analysis is very complicated and Judge
Leif Clark has conceded that the analysis does not work unless the individual debtor
is engaged in business. See Reed v. Yochem (In re Reed), 184 B.R. 733, 739-40
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995); Clark, supra note 163, at 182 & n.97.
192. See In re Herberman, 122 B.R. at 282-83 (stating that the court granted the
debtor a salary under section 503(b)(1)(A) as an administrative expense); see also
Gummow, supra note 129, at 385-86 & n.25 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 355
(1977)) (arguing that legislative history indicates that the sole proprietorship debtor
be employed by the estate and receive a salary); Phillips & Shively, Ruminations,
supra note 129, at 637-39 (analyzing section 541 (a)(6) in light of section 365(c)(1)(A),
where the trustee or debtor-in-possession must assume a contract in order to bring the
earnings into the estate and then employ the debtor and pay him a salary which is
then excepted from the estate under section 541(a)(6)).
193. See In re Herberman, 122 B.R. at 277-78; see also 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (providing
that Chapters 1, 3, and 5 apply to cases commenced under Chapters 7, 11, 12, or 13).
194. "The debtor is presumed to be aware of all the ramifications of a chapter
proceeding before voluntarily submitting himself to the regimen.... [nor is a]
voluntary petition.., compelled in any legal sense.... In re Herberman, 122 B.R. at
283-84. The court also noted that there is no constitutional right to file for
bankruptcy. See id. at 384; see also In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 748-49 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1993) (quoting the Supreme Court in Toibb in support of the proposition that
involuntary servitude is an irrelevant contention in Chapter 11); supra note 153
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Lastly, Herberman reasoned that an individual debtor in Chapter
11, as debtor-in-possession, owes a fiduciary duty to the estate.191 The
debtor must harmonize this duty "with his self-interested role as the
entrepreneur operating the business of the enterprise,"' balancing
his interests with those of his creditors' 91 because "[t]here can be no
'part' of a debtor that is not 'in bankruptcy' during the pendency of a
[C]hapter 11 proceeding." 19
Given the special nature of the
responsibilities of the individual Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession, this
court believed that the best way to maintain the integrity of the Code
was to have the debtor draw a salary from his own business.1 9 In
practice, compensating the debtor-in-possession with a salary is easier
to administer than dissecting the post-petition earnings of the sole
proprietorship from the post-petition earnings of the individual
debtor.)t
The majority approach illustrates the problems that courts have
faced when interpreting section 541(a)(6) in the context of a sole
proprietorship."1 In FitzSimmons, the Ninth Circuit interjected the
word "personal" into section 541(a)(6).2 0Consistent with
FitzSimmons, courts have attempted to distinguish between postpetition income derived from a debtor's personal services and postpetition income derived from property of the estate in order to divide
the earnings according to their origin. 1 3 Others have placed the
burden of proving this distinction on the creditors.2- These courts
have invoked the debtor's fresh startm and their reluctance to
(discussing the Supreme Court's Thirteenth Amendment argument).
195. See In re Herbernman, 122 B.R. at 280-82.
196. Id at 281.
197. See id. at 281-82.
198. Id at 279.
199. See id at 282.
200. Compare In re Herbennan, 122 B.R. at 287-88 (granting the debtor a salary
from the estate), with FitzSimmons v. Walsh (In re FitzSimmons), 725 F.2d 1208, 1212
(9th Cir. 1984) (dissecting the earnings of the business from the earnings of the
debtor).
201. For various commentators' analyses of the earnings exception of section
541(a)(6) in differing contexts, see Clark, supra note 163, at 182 n.96, 97, 183-89,
(arguing that Chapter 11 is sufficiently flexible to accommodate all types of debtors);
Gummow, supra note 129, at 393 (concluding determination of property of the estate
for individual Chapter 11 debtor engaged in business is complicated and depends on
facts of each case); Jack F. Williams, The Federal Tar Consequences of Individual
Debtor Chapter 11 Cases, 46 S.C. L Rev. 1203, 1214-30 (1995) (discussing section
541(a)(6) cases and arguing that none of them were properly decided because the tax
consequences of I.R.C. § 1398 were not considered by the courts in their analyses).
202. See In re FitzSimmons, 725 F.2d at 1211. But see In re Cooley, 87 B.R. 432,439
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988) (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for judicially interjecting the
term "personally" into the statute).
203. See, eg., In re FitzSimmons, 725 F.2d at 1212 (remanding case for valuation of
services "personally" earned by the individual debtor).
204. See In re Cooley, 87 B.R. at 441.
205. See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text (discussing the debtor's fresh

start).
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implicate the Thirteenth Amendment as among the policy
considerations in support of their analyses." Although courts have
expended much time and effort in determining what property
constitutes the individual debtor's estate in Chapter 11, especially the
debtor with a sole proprietorship, there is no requirement in that
chapter that a debtor finance his plan with estate property. Moreover,
some courts have required debtors to use the very funds that are
excluded from the estate by a section 541 analysis to confirm a plan
under section 1129. The next part describes the Chapter 11 plan
confirmation process, and illustrates how it conflicts with courts'
interpretations of what constitutes property of the estate under
section 541.
III. INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS AND CHAPTER 11 PLAN CONFIRMATION

This part examines the individual debtor and plan confirmation in
Chapter 11 cases, and reveals that although the provisions of Chapter
11 do not require that the individual debtor contribute post-petition
earnings to fund the plan, courts often do require this contribution.
Debtors must satisfy the confirmation requirements of section
1129(a) 207 in order to reap the benefits of Chapter 11. This obligation
has proven to be particularly difficult for the individual Chapter 11
debtor regardless of whether the debtor is engaged in business. 28 This
210
29
Note focuses on the requirements of good faith 0 and feasibility
because these requirements are the most basic to confirmation and
are most often violated by individual Chapter 11 debtors. Section
1129(a)(3) requires that the plan of reorganization be proposed in
good faith and not contrary to law. 211 Although good faith is not
defined under the Code, "a plan is considered proposed in good faith
if there is a reasonable likelihood that the [p]lan will achieve a result
2 12
consistent with the standards prescribed under the Code.
The debtor's ability to fund a plan of reorganization is the primary
factor that courts consider when determining whether the individual

206. See In re Molina y Vedia, 150 B.R. 393, 398-401 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992); In re
Cooley, 87 B.R. at 437-38; see also supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text
(discussing the Thirteenth Amendment).
207. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1994); see also supra notes 54-60 and accompanying
text (describing the confirmation standards of section 1129(a)).
208. See infra notes 211-43 and accompanying text (discussing the individual debtor
and confirmation proceedings).
209. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of good faith
under Chapter 11.
210. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of feasibility
under Chapter 11.
211. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).
212. In re Kemp, 134 B.R. 413, 414 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991) (citations omitted); see
also In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410,425 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying a similar
good faith standard to a corporate Chapter 11 debtor).
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debtor has proposed his plan in good faith.
Remarkably, some
courts have construed section 1129(a)(3) to require the individual
debtor to contribute post-petition earnings in funding a plan of
reorganization, even though there is no such requirement in Chapter
11 and the post-petition earnings of the individual debtor are not
considered property of the estate. 214 These courts acknowledge that
post-petition income earned from the individual debtor's personal
services is not property of the estate under section 541(a)(6), but
nevertheless consider how the debtor has previously spent the
excluded funds when deciding whether a plan has been proposed in
good faith.2 15 As one court has noted, "[i]f the debtor's plan provides
that the debtor will use his substantial income to make heavy
mortgage payments on a lavish house, to pay for luxury cars, and to
generally support an extravagant lifestyle, the plan may not meet the
confirmation requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a). 2 - 6
The court in In re Weber2 17 also acknowledged that "[iln practical
reality, individual debtors vill generally need to utilize some portion
of the very post petition earnings which are excluded from the estate
in order to fund a confirmable plan of reorganization."",, In addition,
the court observed that "[t]he difficulty lies in determining how to
measure whether a financial commitment is sufficient. 219 The Weber
court applied Chapter 13's disposable income test,20 finding that it
provided a suitable guideline to determine whether the debtor's plan
had proposed sufficient funding from post-petition income to satisfy
213. See In re Kemp, 134 B.R. at 414-15.
214. See Roland v. Unun Life Ins. Co., 223 B.R. 499, 503-06 (E.D. Va. 1998); In re
Weber, 209 B.R. 793, 798-800 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997); In re Harman, 141 B.R. 878,
889 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); it re Kemp, 134 B.R. at 415 (holding that the individual
debtor had not proposed his plan in good faith because he was financially -capable of
making payments substantially higher than he has offered in his Plan" and therefore
denying confirmation of the debtor's plan). But see In re Flor, 166 B.R. 512, 515-16
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1994) (holding that debtor's plan, which was to be funded with postpetition income, violated section 1129(a)(3) because Connecticut law proscribed
assignment of future wages).
215. See Roland, 223 B.R. at 506 (citing In re Fernandez, 97 B.R. 262, 263 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1989)).
216. In re Fernandez, 97 B.R. at 263. Moreover, the court noted that although
there is no "disposable income" test in Chapter 11, the ability to pay is a factor in
determining whether a plan has been proposed in good faith. See id.
217. 209 B.R. at 800 (holding the individual debtor's plan unconfirmable because,
as proposed, it did not diminish the debtor's lavish lifestyle and only purported to pay
creditors a five percent dividend).
218. Id. at 798 n.7; see also In re Keenan, 195 B.R. 236, 242-43 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1996) (finding that lack of funds with which to finance a reorganization, where the
debtor does not contribute post-petition earnings to the plan, may result in conversion
or dismissal); In re Powell, 187 B.R. 642, 647 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (same); In re
Altchek, 124 B.R. 944, 956 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same).
219. In re Weber, 209 B.R. at 799.
220. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text for a description of the
disposable income test in Chapter 13.
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the good faith requirement.2 1
When considering whether to convert a case from Chapter 11 into a
Chapter 7 liquidation, or whether to dismiss it altogether, z 2 courts
have also examined the individual debtor's ability to pay in relation to
good faith under section 1112(b), 2 governing conversion or dismissal
of a case for cause. Granting a motion to convert or dismiss is
appropriate where the court determines that the plan is
unconfirmable.?4 For example, in deciding a creditor's section
1112(b) motion to convert the case to one under Chapter 7, the court
in Rundlett stated that "the debtor's plan must be tenable and must
reflect that the debtor will fund the plan with income that does not
already constitute property of the estate." 6 In making these remarks,
the court implied that the individual debtor's post-petition earnings,
which are not included as property of the estate under section
541(a)(6), must be used to fund the plan. 7
Section 1129(a)(11) requires that the debtor's plan, as proposed to
the court, be feasible.'
Although this standard does not require
guaranteed success, the debtor must be able to carry out the plan that
he has proposed. 9
In the individual-debtor context, courts
221. See In re Weber, 209 B.R. at 798-99. The court was reluctant to apply the
disposable income test without noting that Chapter 13 could only be initiated
voluntarily, while Chapter 11 may be initiated involuntarily and the court stressed
that individual debtors who have accumulated too much debt, thus making them
ineligible for Chapter 13, should not receive more favorable treatment in Chapter 11
than in Chapter 13. See id. at 799.
222. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of conversion or
dismissal under section 1112(b).
223. See In re Rundlett, 136 B.R. 376, 381 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (discussing good
faith and dismissing the case under section 1112(b) because the debtor had the ability
to pay yet did not propose sufficient payments in his plan); In re Tejano, 135 B.R. 686,
688 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1991) (same); In re Devine, 131 B.R. 952, 956 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1991) (same); In re Canion, 129 B.R. 465, 470 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989) (same); In re
Khan, 34 B.R. 574, 579-80 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (same). If a court finds that the
debtor's plan is unconfirmable under section 1129, the court may have the debtor
amend the plan, or the court may dismiss or convert the case under section 1112(b)
for cause, including an inability to effectuate a plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1994).
224. See In re Rundlett, 136 B.R. at 381 (citing Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157
(1991)).
225. 136 B.R. 376 (1992).
226. Id. at 380-81; see also In re Tejano, 135 B.R. at 688 ("If an individual without a
business is to file a chapter 11 case, then reorganization must ordinarily be the goal
and the debtor must devote his [post-petition] income to that goal.").
227. See In re Rundlett, 136 B.R. at 381; see also supra Part I.B (describing section
541 and property of the estate). Judge Schwartzberg had previously engaged in the
exercise of determining whether the post-petition earnings of an individual Chapter
11 debtor with a sole proprietorship became property of the estate. See In re Altchek,
124 B.R. 944, 956 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
228. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11); see also supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text
(describing section 1129(a)(11) and feasibility).
229. See In re Harman, 141 B.R. 878, 884 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) ("The standards
for determining plan feasibility are not rigorous." (citations omitted)); In re Kemp 134
B.R. 413, 415 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991) (stating that the purpose of section 1129(a)(11)
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interpreting section 1129(a)(11) look to the same factors as they
would when determining whether a corporate debtor's plan is
feasible 3 0 Ascertaining whether a debtor's plan is feasible is highly
fact-sensitive and will necessarily depend on the facts of each case. 1
Individual debtors who propose to fund their plans without including
their post-petition earnings, and who do not have any other means
with which to pay creditors, risk rejection of their plans by the
bankruptcy court.
Courts also consider the feasibility requirement of section
1129(a)(11) when the individual debtor is unable to consensually
confirm a plan and seeks to "cram down" the plan over objecting
creditors? 2 An individual debtor may violate the absolute priority
rule 3 by attempting to cram down a plan that proposes retention of
some of his non-exempt property while not providing for full payment
to his creditors. 4 The individual debtor in this situation is deemed to
be a "junior creditor" and cannot retain any property on account of
his interest unless all other claims above him are satisfied. 5
The leading case analyzing the individual debtor and nonconsensual confirmation or "cram down" under section 1129(b) is
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers. " in which the Supreme Court
held that "sweat equity" did not constitute new value in order to cram
down a plan on creditors? 7 Adhering to the ruling in Ahlers,
bankruptcy courts have concluded that the contribution of the
debtor's post-petition income is an insufficient source of "new
is to prevent confirmation of visionary schemes).
230. Compare In re Kemp, 134 B.R. at 416 (individual debtor), with In re Orlando
Investors, L.P., 103 B.R. 593,600 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (corporate debtor).
231. See In re Kemp, 134 B.R. at 416 (citing Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du
Bois, 312 U.S. 510,527 (1941)).
232. See supra notes 83-97 and accompanying test for a discussion of nonconsensual confirmation in Chapter 11.
233. The absolute priority rule holds that either the unsecured class be paid in full
or that junior classes receive or retain no property on account of or because of their
interests. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B); supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text
(describing the absolute priority rule).
234. Cram down cannot be effectuated where a junior class retains property on
account of their interests. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B); supra notes 83-97 and
accompanying text (discussing non-consensual confirmation).
235. See infra note 239 (examining cases in which courts denied individual debtors
confirmation because creditors objected to their plans that proposed retention of nonexempt property).
236. 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
237. See idLat 204-05; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (detailing non-consensual
confirmation); Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St.
Partnership, 119 S.Ct. 1411, 1417-19 (1999); supra notes 83-97 and accompanying text
(discussing consensual and non-consensual confirmation under Chapter 11). In
response to one of the lower court's holdings in this case, Congress enacted Chapter
12 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1986. See Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 210-11. Chapter 12 is
available for family farmers, usually individual debtors with sole proprietorships, and
contains the best interest of creditors test and the disposable income test. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231.

1774

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

value" 8 to justify deviation from the absolute priority rule.23 9
Although the Supreme Court in Ahlers held only that the "promise of
future services" on the debtor's farm was inadequate as new value,240
these courts have extended the holding in Ahlers so that even a
commitment of wages or future income will not satisfy the new value
exception. These courts reason that new value must come from an
outside source, whereas future income derives from the debtor
himself.2 4
Courts have also opined that new value must be
contributed "up front," either on the plan's confirmation date or on its
effective date, and because the debtor must work before he is able to
receive future income, he is unable to meet the up-front
requirement.2 42 Thus, where the individual debtor wants to cram
down a plan and offers future wages as "new value" so that he may
retain property, courts find the new value insufficient and hold the
plan not feasible and therefore, unconfirmable. 24 3
Individual debtors face a variety of problems in confirming their
plans of reorganization, whether they seek to confirm consensually or
non-consensually. Good faith and feasibility are the main obstacles in
the path of the individual debtor on the road to confirmation, in that
these requirements often require the debtor to contribute his postpetition earnings to fund the plan, even though a section 541 analysis
would exclude these funds from the estate. The next part compares
section 541 and the confirmation requirements of section 1129 and
argues that Congress should amend the Code to bring conflicting
interpretations of these sections in line with one another.

238. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the new value
exception to the absolute priority rule.
239. See, e.g., In re Rocha, 179 B.R. 305, 306-08 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding
that new value must come from an outside source and not the debtor himself); In re
Kovalchick, No. 91-24182-3DAS, 1995 WL 118171, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 15,
1995) (same); In re Bolton, 188 B.R. 913, 916 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1995) (same); In re
Cipparone, 175 B.R. 643, 645-46 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994) (same); In re Harman, 141
B.R. 878, 885-88 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (same); In re Yasparro, 100 B.R. 91, 99-100
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (same); In re Pecht, 57 B.R. 137, 140-41 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1986) (same); In re East, 57 B.R. 14, 17-19 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985) (same). But see In
re Henke, 90 B.R. 451, 454-58 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988) (confirming individual debtor's
plan over objection of creditors where new value proposed was income generated by
the debtor himself and labor on the debtor's farm).
240. See Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 202-09.
241. See In re Rocha, 179 B.R. at 307; In re Harman, 141 B.R. at 887 (speculating
that a money gift from a friend or relative may satisfy the outside capital requirement
for the individual debtor in Chapter 11 cram down).
242. See In re Kovalchick, 1995 WL 118171, at *5-*7; In re Pecht, 57 B.R. at 140.

243. See supra note 239 for an examination of individual Chapter 11 debtor cram
down cases. Most of the cases dealing with section 1129(a)(11) in the individual
debtor context also deal with the issue of non-consensual confirmation.
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IV. THE SENATE'S PROPOSED AMENDMENTS: RECONCILING

SECTION 541 AND THE CHAPTER 11 CONFIRMATION
STANDARDS

Part I described courts' interpretations of section 541(a)(6) in
determining what constitutes property of the individual Chapter 11
debtor's estate, while Part III detailed the confirmation standards of
Chapter 11 for the individual debtor. This part analyzes both sections
of the Code in light of the goal of confirmation and introduces the
Senate's recently passed amendments that would require the
individual Chapter 11 debtor to contribute his post-petition earnings,
in the form of a disposable income test, to fund his plan. This Note
argues in favor of the passage of these amendments.
If the individual Chapter 11 debtor seeks consensual confirmation
of his plan and does not propose to fund the plan with post-petition
income, the plan will most likely be unconfirmable, because it does
not meet the provisions of section 1129(a) regarding good faith and
feasibility.2 " In contrast, where the debtor seeks to cram down his
plan and retain any of his non-exempt property, he will be unable to
confirm if he proposes to fund the plan with his post-petition
earnings?45 If he proposes to fund the plan with future earnings, he
cannot confirm non-consensually, and if he does not propose funding
with future earnings, then he cannot confirm consensually. The
individual debtor thus finds himself in a conundrum.
Notwithstanding courts' confusion as to whether post-petition
income constitutes property of the individual Chapter 11 debtor's
estate, courts have not construed Chapter 11's confirmation standards
to turn on this distinction. Whereas section 541 governs property of
the estate in all cases under Chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13, the boundaries
of this section as applied in Chapter 11 are amorphous. 2 Despite the
focus of creditors, debtors, and courts, the precise contours of the
property of the estate have little consequence to the ultimate goal of
confirmation.2 47 Section 541 is thus a red herring in individual
244. See supra notes 207-31 and accompanying text (discussing individual Chapter
11 consensual confirmation cases).
245. See supra notes 233-43 and accompanying text (analyzing individual Chapter
11 non-consensual confirmation cases).

246. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (examining property of the
estate in Chapter 11); supra note 181 (discussing liquidating Chapter 11 cases).
247. Valuation of the debtor's estate under section 541 is important for a variety of
reasons, including determining whether the "best interest of creditors test" is met for
plan confirmation under Chapter 11 or 13, and in the circumstance where the case is
converted to one under Chapter 7. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1994) (providing
that creditors of a Chapter 11 debtor not receive less than they would in a Chapter 7
liquidation), with id. § 1325(a)(4) (same in Chapter 13); compare id. § 1112(b) (stating
that a case may be converted to Chapter 7), with id. § 1307 (same); see also 7 Collier
on Bankruptcy I 1129.03[7](b)(i) n.91 (15th ed. 1999) (describing that the liquidation
value of property of the estate should be included in all Chapter 11 plans to aid in
determining if the best interest of creditors test is satisfied).
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Chapter 11 debtor cases because Chapter 11 does not require that
estate property be used to fund the plan of reorganization. Judge
Kaplan, in In re Keenan,48 understood this and refused to decide
whether the property at issue in that case was property of the
individual debtor's estate.249 Instead, Judge Kaplan ruled that the
individual debtor in Chapter 11 may use estate property for personal
needs and that if the use of these funds was "wanton," creditors could
attempt to have the case dismissed or converted.uo
There is no statutory provision in Chapter 11 relating to the
inclusion or exclusion of post-petition income of the individual debtor,
either as property of the estate or as a pre-requisite to plan
confirmation."1
Chapter 11 contains no requirement that either
property of the estate or property other than that constituting the
estate be used to finance the debtor's reorganization. 2 If the debtor
in Chapter 11 is able to fund a plan and the creditors are paid, the
source of the financing makes no difference. 3
Nor does Chapter 11 include a disposable income test, 2 4 although
courts often introduce one when deciding whether to confirm an
individual debtor's plan. 5
Courts that have interpreted section
1129(a) to require that the individual debtor fund his plan with postpetition earnings to satisfy the good faith and feasibility requirements
have effectively written a disposable income test into Chapter 11. 26 If
Congress had intended, by the inclusion of the good faith
requirement, that courts should impose a disposable income test on
the individual debtor, then the disposable income test in Chapters 13
would be redundant, because this Chapter also includes a good faith
requirement for plan confirmation. 7 Courts' interpretations of the
confirmation standards of section 1129 to require that individual
debtors contribute post-petition earnings to their plans are consistent
with the general policy of not tolerating debtors who abuse the Code,
but inconsistent with the plain language of the Code. Congress should
248. 195 B.R. 236 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996).
249. See id. at 240-44; see also supra note 218 (discussing the holding in Keenan).
250. See In re Keenan, 195 B.R. at 240-44 (citing In re Altchek, 124 B.R. 944, 955-56
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
251. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1166.
252. See In re Keenan, 195 B.R. at 243 (discussing that there is no mandate that the
debtor fund his plan with estate property or post-petition income).
253. See id.
254. The disposable income test requires that the debtor contribute his postpetition income above what is needed for the support and maintenance of the debtor
and his dependents. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the disposable income test in the Chapter 13 context.
255. See, e.g., In re Weber, 209 B.R. 793, 799 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (applying a
disposable income test to an individual Chapter 11 debtor).
256. See id.
257. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1994). Chapter 12 also contains a disposable
income test. See id. § 1225(a)(3).
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therefore amend the Code to conform the plain language of the
statute with the courts' results, as these results correctly refuse to
allow the individual debtor to abuse the Code by attempting to gain a
benefit in Chapter 11 by avoiding a disposable income test, where the
debtor would be subject to such a test in Chapter 13.
The Senate has recently passed amendments to its version of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999.1 Currently, these amendments
include in the estate the post-petition income of the individual
Chapter 11 debtor and require him to use this income to fund his plan
of reorganization. These amendments are needed in order to bring
the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code in line with both the
courts' results and the policies behind the Code.59 The first of the
Senate's amendments to Chapter 11 creates a new section, section
1115, entitled "Property of the Estate."' This section provides:
In a case concerning an individual, property of the estate includes, in
addition to the property specified in section 541(1) all property of the kind specified in section 541 that the debtor
acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is
closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13,
whichever occurs first; and

(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the
commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed,
to a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13, whichever occurs
or converted
261
first.

This proposed amendment would define property of the estate for the
individual Chapter 11 debtor to include the debtor's post-petition
earnings. The proposed language tracks the language of comparable
provisions in Chapters 12 and 13, specifically sections 1207 and
1306. 2
The second of the Senate's amendments would require that the
debtor's plan of reorganization draw upon his post-petition earnings.
25& See 145 Cong. Rec. S14493, Sec. 321 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1999).
259. Other amendments may be necessary, such as an amendment regarding the
stay against co-debtors. Such amendments are beyond the scope of this Note.
260. The Senate has also proposed an amendment to section 541(a)(6). This
amendment alters the section to read:
Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the
estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual
debtor (other than an individual debtor who, in accordance with section 301,
files a petition to commence a voluntary case under Chapter 11) after the
commencement of the case.
S. Rep. No. 106-49, at 395 (1999). This amendment is important because it limits the
application of the Chapter 11 disposable income test to voluntarily initiated petitions
and thus avoids a possible violation of the Thirteenth Amendment's proscription
against involuntary servitude. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment.
261. See 145 Cong. Rec. S14493, § 321 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1999).
262. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1207,1306.
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Thus, section 1123(a) would be annexed to provide:
(8) in a case concerning an individual, provide for the payment to
creditors through the plan of all or such portion of earnings from
personal services performed by the debtor after the commencement
of the case or other future income of the debtor as is necessary for
the execution of the plan. 63
This amendment would require that the individual debtor's plan
commit any of the debtor's future earnings as necessary for
implementing the plan of reorganization.
The last of the Senate's amendments modifies the confirmation
standards of section 1129. Section 1129(a) would be appended to
include:
(14) In a case concerning an individual in which the holder of an
allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan(A) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan on
account of such claim is, as of the effective date of the plan, not less
than the amount of such claim; or
(B) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan is not
less than the debtor's projected disposable income (as the term is
defined in section 1325(b)(2)) to be received during the three-year
period beginning on the date that the first payment is due264 under the
plan, or during the term of the plan, whichever is longer.
This proposed amendment obligates the debtor to either pay an
objecting creditor's claim in full or contribute his disposable income to
the plan. The language of this amendment tracks the language of
section 1325(b)(1), except that the individual Chapter 11 debtor must
contribute his disposable income for at least three years, or longer if
his plan so provides.
The final amendment to section 1129 is inserted at the end of
subsection 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and provides: "except that in a case
concerning an individual, the debtor may retain property included in
the estate under section 1115, subject to the requirements of
subsection (a)(14). ' 65 This amendment would allow the individual
debtor to retain property and non-consensually confirm or "cram
down" a plan of reorganization if he pays dissenting creditors' claims
in full or contributes his disposable income for three years to fund his
plan. The amendment would have the effect of overruling the
Supreme Court's ruling in Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers 66 that
future labor does not constitute new value. It also overrules cases that
have interpreted Ahlers to mean that future income or post-petition
earnings cannot constitute new value in order to invoke the absolute
263.
264.
265.
266.

See 145 Cong. Rec. S14493, § 321 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1999).
Id.
Id.
485 U.S. 197 (1988).

2000]

INDIVIDUAL CHAPTER 11 DEBTOR

1779

priority rule.267 They are overruled because the individual debtor is
permitted under the Senate's proposed amendments to cram down his
plan over dissenting creditors if he either pays their claims in full or
contributes his post-petition disposable income to fund his plan.
These proposed amendments are consistent with the general policy
of Congress and the courts of not permitting a debtor to take
advantage of the provisions of the Code; 268 thus, they provide the
debtor with a "fresh start," but not a "head start."' 9 For example,
courts repeatedly respond to Chapter 7 debtors who have the ability
to pay their creditors either substantially or in full by dismissing their
cases under section 707 for substantial abuse.210 Congress has several
times reacted to abuse of the Code by amending its various provisions
to prevent debtors from gaining more favorable treatment in one
chapter than they could in another.-7
Neither Congress nor any court believes that Chapter 13, with its
disposable income test, provides the individual debtor with any less of
a fresh start than the debtor would receive in Chapters 7 or 11. In
fact, the opposite is true; payment to creditors is consistent with the
debtor's fresh start, as evidenced by dismissals under section 707 and
the judicial interpretations of section 1129 to include post-petition
267. See supra notes 232-43 and accompanying text for a examination of the cases

interpreting Ahlers.
268. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the amendment that
prevented modification of residential liens in Chapter 11); infra notes 270-72 and
accompanying text (describing the situations where Congress has taken action to
prevent abuse of the Code).
269. "[A]llowing a debtor to escape debts that he has the ability to repay would
provide a 'head start' rather than the 'fresh start' envisioned." In re Zaleta, 211 B.R.
178, 180 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1997).

270. See, e.g., In re Kamen, 231 B.R. 275, 277-79 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) (finding
substantial abuse to dismiss under section 707 where debtors accumulated in excess of
$140,000 in credit card debt to maintain a lifestyle above their means); In re
Rodriguez, 228 B.R. 601, 603-06 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1999) (holding that debtor's ability
to pay creditors in full within 10 months under Chapter 13, coupled with post-petition
purchase of new truck, equaled substantial abuse to dismiss under section 707). See
generally In re Zaleta, 211 B.R. at 180-83 (holding ability to repay debts is primary
factor in determining substantial abuse). Currently pending in Congress is an
amendment that would codify courts' interpretations of section 707(b), dismissal for
substantial abuse, on account of the debtor's ability to repay his debts. See 145 Cong.
Rec. S11088, § 625 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch). (-[This bill]

provides us with the opportunity to prevent people who can repay their debts from
'gaming the system' by using loopholes that are presently in place.").
271. For example, the 1994 amendments to the Code harmonized the treatment of
debtors in Chapter 11 with the treatment of debtors in Chapter 13, by preventing
Chapter 11 debtors from modifying liens on their principal residential property where
they could not modify these liens in Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (1994);
H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 46 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340,3354 ("This
amendment conforms the treatment of residential mortgages in chapter 11 to that in
chapter 13 .... ); see also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing this
amendment); supra note 237 (describing the addition of Chapter 12 to the Code,
providing for family farmers, in reaction to the Ahlers case).
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earnings of the individual debtor. Non-payment, on the other hand,
provides the debtor with a head start and should not be tolerated, as it
2 2
is an abuse of the Bankruptcy Code7.
These amendments, if passed,
will prevent individual debtors in Chapter 11 from abusing the Code
by requiring that they contribute their post-petition earnings to fund
their plans and pay their creditors. In addition, the amendments will
facilitate the determination of property of the estate under section 541
for the individual Chapter 11 debtor because the debtor's future
earnings will be available to satisfy creditors' claims. Moreover, these
amendments will stop inconsistent interpretations of the Bankruptcy
Code's provisions, specifically post-petition earnings of the individual
debtor, because regardless of whether the debtor is engaged in
business, those earnings would now constitute property of the Chapter
11 estate and will be used to satisfy creditors' claims. Thus, the
overriding policies of the Code will be reflected by the consistency of
its internal provisions, and the delicate balance between creditors' and
debtors' rights once again restored to equilibrium.
CONCLUSION

In interpreting the Code, courts have faced difficulty in balancing
the competing interests of creditors and debtors. Courts must weigh
opposing policy considerations to find a solution that will achieve a
result consistent with the debtor's fresh start, equitable payment to
creditors, and a refusal to allow abuses of the Code. This tension is
exemplified in courts' interpretations of post-petition earnings under
section 541(a)(6) for the individual debtor with a sole proprietorship,
and the competing interpretations of section 1129 that require the
debtor to use funds excluded from the estate under section 541 in
order to effectuate plan confirmation.
When faced with confirmation of an individual Chapter 11 debtor's
plan, most courts already require that the debtor pledge his postpetition income to the plan as a pre-requisite to granting discharge
and conferring the fresh start. This is consistent with the underlying
policy of not allowing a debtor to receive more favorable treatment in
one chapter than he could receive in another. There is currently no
statutory provision in Chapter 11 that supports either the inclusion or
exclusion of these funds in the debtor's plan. Congress should adopt
the amendments recently proposed by the Senate and formally subject
the individual Chapter 11 debtor to a disposable income test. This
amendment would provide courts with guidance on how to treat the
individual debtor in Chapter 11 and facilitate a more uniform
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.
272. See, e.g., In re Harman, 141 B.R. 878, 888-89 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding
debtor's plan unconfirmable because debtor would maintain excessive lifestyle while
creditors would not be paid).

